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State Control over the Reclamation Waterhole: Reality or 
Mirage? 
Many a less-than-epic Western novel has climaxed in a shootout 
over a waterhole.I While little remains of the West of yesteryear, the 
feud over the waterhole is still very much alive. Today, however, the 
combatants are not gun-slinging cowboys, but brief-toting attorneys. 
The past three decades have witnessed several courtroom show-
downs between the Western states and the Department of the Inte-' 
rior's Bureau of Reclamation over water appropriation for the 
Bureau's reclamation projects.2 The states drew the battle lines by 
trying to use their laws to regulate the Bureau's activities. The Con-
stitution declares a clear winner in most conflicts between state and 
federal law: the supremacy clause3 ordains that where Congress ex-
ercises constitutional power, its laws are the supreme law of the land. 
Thus, if every act of the Bureau had the force of an act of Congress, 
the states would have conceded subservience long ago. But in sec-
tion 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902,4 Congress itself limited the 
Bureau's independence from state control. It stipulated that federal 
reclamation plans were not totally exempt from state water laws. 
This Note assesses how much state law section 8 saves from pre-
emption. Section I reviews the interplay of state and federal water 
law in the West. It begins with a brief description of appropriation, 
the system of water rights found in the Western states, outlines the 
Reclamation Act of 1902, and then traces the Supreme Court's 
evolving construction of the Act. It culminates in a discussion of 
Cal!fornia v. United States,5 the Court's latest gloss on section 8. 
Section II expands the analysis of the Cal!fornia decision, integrating 
it with traditional preemption doctrine. It shows that section 8 re-. 
spects state law unless a project cannot comply with both a state and 
federal law or the state law is clearly inconsistent with a federal rec-
lamation goal. Section III then turns to three specific questions left 
open in Cal!fornia: (1) whether state water law provisions other than 
those involving appropriation may be applied to federal projects; (2) 
whether changes in state law may affect a complet~d federal project; 
l. See, e.g., R. MANNING, TANGLED TRAIL 174-76 (1947); T. THOMPSON, BITIER WATER 
(1960). 
2. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 564 (1963); City of Fresno v. California, 372 
U.S. 627 (1963); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 
U.S. 275 (1958); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
4. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388; (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 373, 381, 383, 391, 392,411,416, 
419, 421, 431, 432,434,439,461,476,491,498 (1976)). 
5. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
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and (3) whether a state law may block construction of a federal pro-
ject. The Note concludes that although Cal!fornia does not foreclose 
all future disagreement, it provides a coherent model for analyzing 
disputes between the Bureau and the western states. 
I. THE HISTORY OF STATE WATER LAW AND THE BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION 
A. The Appropriation System 
The Western states6 use the appropriation system of water rights, 
rather than the riparian system7 common in Eastern states. Under 
the appropriation system, water rights do not attach to the land bor-
dering a stream or river, but vest in the individual who actually di-
verts water. Statutes in all the Western states, 8 and the constitutions 
of many,9 limit water rights to the amount that an individual benefi-
cially uses. 10 And in times of shortage, earlier appropriators have 
6. The 17 states enumerated in 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1976). Sixteen of these - Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming - were included in the 
original 1902 Act. The Act of June 12, 1906, ch. 3288, 34 Stat. 259, extended the provisions of 
the 1902 Act to Texas. 
7. The riparian doctrine is 
[t]he system ... in which owners oflands along the banks of a stream or water body have 
the right to reasonable use of the waters and a correlative right protecting against unrea-
sonable use by others that substantially diminishes the quantity or quality of water. The 
right is appurtenant to the land and does not depend upon prior use. 
7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 310 (R. Clark ed. 1976). 
8. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE§ 1240 (West 1971): ''The appropriation must be for some 
useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to 
use it for such a purpose the right ceases." Both Nevada and New Mexico provide that 
"[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water." 
NEV. REV. STAT.§ 533.035 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (1978). 
9. The California provision, CAL. CONST. art XIV, § 3, is typical: 
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general 
welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest 
extent of which they are capable .... The right to water ... is and shall be limited to 
such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served • • • • 
See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art XVII, § 2; COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art. xv. 
§§ l, 3; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 15. 
IO. The definition of"beneficial use" is necessarily vague. Several states have attempted to 
codify a definition. For example: 
"Beneficial use" means a use of water for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons or 
the public, including but not limited to agricultural (including stock water), domestic, fish 
and wildlife, industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal, power, and recreational uses. A use 
of water for slurry to export coal from Montana is not a beneficial use. 
MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-2911 (4) (Supp. 1977). The statute formerly provided that a 
" '[b]eneficial use' means any economically or socially justifiable withdrawal or utilization of 
water." MONT. REv. CODES ANN.§ 89-291 l(d) (1947) (amended 1973). In addition, see TEX. 
WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.023 (Vernon 1972). 
Examples of judicially defined beneficial uses include the use of water power to operate a 
flouring mill, Isaacs v. Barber, IO Wash. 124, 38 P. 871 (1894), and to develop and maintain a 
power plant. Thompson Co. v. Pennebaker, 173 F. 849 (9th Cir. 1909). 
Courts have held the following uses not to be beneficial: diversion of water solely for 
drainage, Maeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 262 (1857); a claim to water for speculation, Weaver v. 
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superior claims to those who began using the water later. 11 
To obtain a right to use water, an individual must apply to a state 
agency, often the state engineer.12 The agency reviews the applica-
tion, determining whether any unappropriated water in the stream is 
available.· If so, the agency examines the proposed use and may im-
pose conditions to ensure that the water will satisfy the beneficial use 
requirement. 13 In several states, the state agency must also ensure 
that the proposed use is in the "public interest."14 If the agency is 
Eureka Lake Co., 15 Cal. 271 (1860); the application of water to sage brush land without 
significantly increasing the growth of native grasses, Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v: Twin Falls 
Salmon River Land & Water Co., 245 F. 9 (9th Cir. 1917); winter irrigation of land for the 
purpose of drowning gophers in an area greatly needing water, Tulare Irrig. Dist. v. Lindsey-
Strathmore Irrig. Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 568, 45 P.2d 1007 (1935). 
South Dakota uses still another statutory route to defining "beneficial use," limiting the 
amount of irrigation water to two acre-feet of water per acre annually (up to three acre-feet if 
the method of irrigation or the type of soil requires it). Any use in excess of three acre-feet is 
per se not a beneficial use. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 46-5-4 to -6 (1967 and Supp. 1979). 
Moreover, an appropriator may be denied his full allocation ifhe fails to use the entire amount 
beneficially. 
An appropriator's allocation is determined by one of two methods. Water rights antedating 
modem permit systems are quantified in court-issued decrees arising out of a general adjudica-
tion involving the water users on a particular stream. The rights of individuals seeking appro-
priations after the permit system had been established are quantified in a state-issued permit. 
11. See, e.g., Tex. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 5.027 (Vernon 1972) ("As between appro-
priators, the first in time is the first in right."). As a result of this basic principle of the appro-
priation system, the oldest rights to divert from a stream have a much greater economic and 
practical worth than do relatively recent appropriations. 
12. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT.§ 537.130 (1) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 73-3-1, -2 (1953); 
WASH. Rev. CODE § 90.03.250 (1974). 
13. The authority of a state agency to attach beneficial use conditions is generally not 
stated expressly in the statute, but is implied from the duty imposed on the agency by the state' 
statute or constitution prohibiting appropriations unless the beneficial use requirement is satis-
fied. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943). 
14. The basic difference between the beneficial use and public interest requirements lies in 
the fact that in-stream values historically have not been accounted for in defining "beneficial 
use." See note 15 infra and accompanying text. The beneficial use requirement generally 
balances the relative merits of the proposed water use only against other competing out-of-
stream uses. On the other hand, the public interest evaluation is much broader, weighing the 
proposed use against its impact on the local environment. For example, some statutes order a 
public interest evaluation even if the beneficial use requirement has been met: 
If a proposed use neither will impair a use under an existing water right nor prejudicially 
and unreasonably affect the public interest, the chief engineer shall approve all applica-
tions .... Otherwise the chief engineer shall make an order rejecting such application or 
requiring its modification to conform to the public interest to the end that the highest 
public benefit and maximum economical development may result from the use of such 
water. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-71 l (1977). Accord, Nev. REV. STAT. § 533.370(1) (1977); OR. REV. 
STAT.§ 537.190(1) (1977); WASH. Rev. CODE§ 90.03.290 (1974). Oklahoma's similar provi-
sion applies only to withdrawals of water by the United States: 
[I)f the [Water Resources] Board finds that the withdrawal of waters requested [by the 
United States) is not in the best interests of the state, then the Board shall 
1. Have the authority to reduce the amount requested for withdrawal; and/or 
2. Attach such conditions to the proposed withdrawal as the Board deems in har-
mony with the best interest of the state; or 
3. Reject the request for withdrawal in its entirety. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 105.29 (West. Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). The constitutionality of 
this statute has not yet been tested. 
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satisfied, it issues a permit authorizing the proposed use for so long 
as it meets the statutory conditions. 
A significant shortcoming of the appropriation system is that un-
til recently an appropriator had to actually divert water from the 
stream to obtain a vested right in water. Thus in-stream uses - for 
recreation, fish, and wildlife, among others - could not be valid ap-
propriations.15 In theory, appropriators could withdraw all the 
water from a stream, leaving none for in-stream uses. Due in part to 
growing ecological concerns, several states have recently altered 
their appropriation systems to protect in-stream uses.16 
B. The Reclamation Act of 1902 
Until late in the nineteenth century, the federal government took 
a passive role in the development of the West's water resources. 
Congress's first attempt to help develop irrigation was the ill-fated 
Carey Act of 1894, 17 which demonstrated that large scale reclama-
15. The National Water Commission pointed out this shortcoming in state water law: 
The water law systems of most of the States . . . are deficient in that they fail to give 
appropriate recognition to social values of water. These values arise primarily from such 
instream uses as fish and wildlife propagation, recreation, and esthetics. The appropria• 
tion law of the Western States generally requires diversion of water from the stream or 
lake and its application to beneficial use in order for a water right to be created. Instream 
values are thus heavily discounted; water has been diverted from streams to such an ex• 
tent that instream values which should have been protected frequently have been im• 
paired, and sometimes destroyed. 
U.S. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, NEW DIRECTIONS IN U.S. WATER POLICY 63 (1973). 
See generally Tarlock, Recent J)evelopments in the Recognition of Ins/ream Uses in Weslern 
Water Law, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 871; Tarlock, Appropriation far Instream Flow Maintenance: A 
Progress Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211. 
16. Some states have used the "public interest" requirement in the permit evaluation stage 
to modify or deny a permit that would harm in-stream uses. For typical "public interest" 
statutes, see note 14 supra. 
Another statutory technique for protecting in-stream uses is the withdrawal of certain wa- . 
ters from the amount available for appropriation. Montana, for example, has provided that 
[t]he states or any political subdivision or agency thereof, or the United States, or any 
agency thereof, may apply to the board to reserve waters for existing or future beneficial 
uses, or to maintain a minimum fl.ow, level, or quality of water throughout the year or at 
such periods or for such length of time as the board designates. 
MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 89-890(1) (Supp. 1977). The Oregon legislature has specifically 
withdrawn the water of enumerated streams from appropriation or diversion. OR. REV. STAT, 
§§ 536.410, 538.110- .300 (1977). Washington has achieved a similar result by authorizing the 
State Department of Water Resources to establish minimum flow levels for streams. See 
WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.22.010 (1974). Colorado and Arizona allow state agencies to appropri• 
ate water for in-stream uses without requiring actual diversion. See COLO. REV. STAT, § 37• 
92-102 (3) (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-141(A) (Supp. 1978). 
17. Ch. 301, § 4, 28 Stat. 422 (1894) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 641 (1976)). The Carey Act 
provided that the United States would donate one million acres of land to each state that 
participated through constructing large irrigation projects. The states were then to sell the land 
to settlers in 160-acre tracts. The burden of financing the projects, which rested initially upon 
the states and private concerns, and eventually upon the heavily mortgaged farmers who 
purchased the lands se~yilie projects, proved immense. See Sax, Federal Reclamation 
Law, in 2 WATE~ND WATER RIGHTS 111, 120-21 (R. Clark ed. 1967); Trelease, Reclamation 
Water Rights,32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 464-65 (1960). 
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tion projects were not profitable undertakings. To reclaim the West, 
an alternative to private funding would be needed. 
The search for a feasible means of reclaiming the arid lands of 
the West bore fruit in the Reclamation Act of 1902.18 The Act cre-
ated the Bureau of Reclamation (then the Reclamation Service) to 
administer projects that would be funded from the sale of public 
lands. Congress intended to recoup its investment, with the project 
costs to be repaid eventually by the users of the reclamation water. 
Since the tum of the century, Congress has amended the Act several 
times19 and has authorized specific projects by individual acts.20 
There are presently over 165 federal reclamation projects in opera-
tion.21 
In drafting the Reclamation Act of 1902, one of the major ques-
tions was the role state water law would play in the federal reclama-
tion scheme. Congress's ambiguous answer was section 8: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect 
or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relat-
ing to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water used in 
irrigation, or any vested rights acquired thereunder, and the Secretary 
of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall proceed 
in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way af-
fect any right of any state or of the Federal Government or of any 
landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any inter-state 
stream or the waters thereof: Provided, the right to the use of water 
acquired under the provisions of this act shall be appurtenant to the 
land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and 
the limit of the right.22 
18. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 373, 383, 391, 392, 411, 416, 
419, 421, 431, 432, 434, 439, 461, 491, & 498 (1976)). 
19. E.g., Act of Feb. 2, 1911, ch. 32, §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 895 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 374 
(1976)); Act of May 20, 1920, ch. 192, §§ 1-3, 41 Stat. 605 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 375 (1976)); 
Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, § 8, 58 Stat. 891 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 390 (1976)); Act of June 
29, 1948, ch. 733, § 1, 62 Stat. 1108 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 385a (1976)). 
20. E.g., Act of Aug. 2, 1937, ch. 55, 50 Stat. 557, as amended, Act of Apr. 9, 1938, ch. 134, 
52 Stat. 211, Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 637, § 1, 69 Stat. 556 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 600a (1976)) 
(Arch Hurley Conservatory District Project, New Mexico); Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1183, § l, 
64 Stat. I 124 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 600b (1976)) (Canadian River Reclamation Project, 
Texas); Act of Feb. 25, 1956, ch. 71, § 1, 70 Stat. 28 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 615 (1976)) 
(Washita River Basin Reclamation Project, Oklahoma); Act of Aug. 6, 1956, ch. 980, § 1, 70 
Stat. 1058 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 615f (1976)) (Crooked River Federal Reclamation Project, 
Oregon). 
21. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WATER & LAND RE-
SOURCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 1975 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (1976). 
22. Ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976)). As codified in 43 
U.S.C. § 383 (1976), the enumeration "sections 372,373,383,392,411,416,419,421,431,432, 
434,439,461,491 and 498 of this title" is substituted for the words "this Act" that appear in 
the Statutes at Large. These enumerated sections were the original sections of the 1902 Act. It 
is generally assumed that the acts supplementing and amending the 1902 Act incorporated§ 8, 
so the specific enumeration in 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976) should not be taken as a limitation of its 
effect. See Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. Cow. L. REV. 49 (1964), 
for an analysis of the effect of§ 8 before California. 
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If Congress had desired, it could have preempted the application 
of state law to Bureau projects entirely.23 Section 8, however, indi-
cates that Congress did not exercise its full power, but instead in-
tended state law to govern some aspects of the reclamation projects. 
The question is, what aspects?24 
C. The Supreme Court and Section 8 
Ivanhoe Irrigation .District v. McCracken25 was the Supreme 
Court's first significant opportunity to construe section 8, nearly 
fifty-six years after its enactment. Section 5 of the Reclamation Act 
imposed a 160-acre limitation on water deliveries from federal recla-
mation projects.26 In Ivanhoe, the Supreme Court of California had 
determined that California law forbade such a limitation and had 
held that section 8 required the Bureau to comply with state law -
to deliver water without regard to the 160-acre limitation.27 The 
Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "Section 5 is a specific and 
mandatory prerequisite laid down by the Congress as binding in the 
operation of reclamation projects . . . . [W]e do not believe that 
Congress intended § 8 to override the repeatedly reaffirmed national 
policy of§ 5."28 The Court cautioned that it was not "passing gener-
ally on the coverage of§ 8 in the delicate area of federal-state rela-
tions in the irrigation field,"29 but then proceeded to do exactly that: 
As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with 
state law when . . . it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights 
or vested interests therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not 
23. Two ·sources of congressional power would justify the total preemption of state water 
law affecting federal reclamation projects. First, the commerce clause gives Congress the abil-
ity to regulate commerce on navigable streams. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See The Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 
377 (1940). Second, Congress created Bureau projects under its power to tax and spend for the 
general welfare, contained in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See United States v. Gerlach Live 
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). However, it may be noted that congressional power over 
reclamation was much less certain in 1902, and § 8 may have been an attempt by Congress to 
assure that the 1902 Act would not be ruled unconstitutional. 
24. Over the years, commentators have expressed a wide variety of views on the extent to 
which § 8 recognizes state law. These theories have ranged from a ''veto theory," contending 
that § 8 allows a state to prevent any Bureau project not fully complying with state law, to a 
"proprietary theory," which reads § 8 only to require that state law be used for defining the 
property interests that the Bureau must compensate when it exercises its power of eminent 
domain. For an explanation of the basis for the veto theory (although not an endorsement of 
it), see Sax, supra note 22, at 62-69. For an elaboration on the proprietary theory, see the 
Supreme Court opinions discussed in the text at notes 26-40 & 61 infra. 
25. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). 
26. 32 Stat. 389 (1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976)). Congress inserted the 160-acre 
limitation into the Act to ensure that one of its major purposes, the settlement of the West by 
small farmers, would not be frustrated by monopolization and speculation. See Sax, supra 
note 17, at 210. 
27. Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. All Parties & Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 506 P.2d 824 (1957). 
28. 357 U.S. at 291-92. 
29. 357 U.S. at 292. 
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be confused with the operation of federal pr9jects. . . We read noth-
ing in§ 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions 
imposed by the state. 30 
The Supreme Court reiterated the Ivanhoe dicta five years later 
in City of Fresno v. Cal!fornia.31 Fresno had sought a declaratory 
judgment that California's statutory priority of domestic use over ir-
rigation and watershed-of-origin uses,32 coupled with section 8, pro-
hibited the Secretary of the Interior from giving priority to irrigation 
users and charging more for municipal water than for irrigation 
water.33 The Secretary had claimed authority to favor irrigation 
under section 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939.34 Instead 
of limiting its opinion to the specific conflict between section 9(c) and 
section 8, and explaining that section 8 was not intended to override 
specific mandates of subsequent reclamation laws, the Court painted 
in much broader strokes: "The effect of§ 8 . . . is to leave to state 
law the definition of the property interests, if any, for which compen-
sation must be made."35 
The Court continued to espouse a proprietary interpretation of 
section 8 in Arizona v. Ca!!fornia,36 a case arising under the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act.37 In Arizona, the Court was asked whether 
state or federal law would govern the distribution of project water to 
users within the three states principally involved in the project.38 
The Court explained: 
The argument that § 8 of the Reclamation Act requires the United 
States in the delivery of water to follow priorities laid down by state 
law has already been disposed of by the Court in Ivanhoe ... and 
reaffirmed in City of Fresno . . . . Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act 
did not subject the Secretary to state law in [Ivanhoe], we cannot, con-
sistently with Ivanhoe, hold that the Secretary must be bound by state 
law in disposing of water under the Project Act.39 
30. 357 U.S. at 291-92. 
31. 372 U.S. 627 (1963). Fresno was decided the same day as Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 
(1963), which involved the same fact situation. The Court's opinion in .Dugan provides a more 
comprehensive review of the issues and factual background than Fresno. 
32. CAL. WATER CODE§§ 11460, 11463 (Wesi 1971). 
33. 372 U.S. at 629-30. 
34. Ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1195 (1939) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 48h{c) (1976)) provides 
that "[n]o contract relating to municipal water supply ... shall be made unless in the judg-
ment of the Secretary, it will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes." 
35. 372 U.S. at 630. 
36. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
37. Ch. 42, § 1, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1976)). Section 14 of the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act incorporates the 1902 Act: "This subchapter shall be deemed a 
supplement to the reclamation law, which said reclamation law shall govern the construction, 
operation, and management of the words herein authorized .... " Ch. 42, § 14, 45 Stat. 1065 
(1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617m (1976)). 
38. The Court was also confronted with apportionment of the waters of the Colorado 
River among the various states of the lower Colorado Basin. 373 U.S. at 551. 
39. 373 U.S. at 586-87. 
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The Court was heavily influenced by the multistate nature of the 
Project.40 It believed that Congress did not intend section 8 to frus-
trate its comprehensive plan for the distribution of water within a 
multistate area. 
Taken together, Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona appeared to lay to 
rest any notion that states could regulate federal reclamation 
projects. After .fifteen years of hibernation, however, the savings 
clause of section 8 reasserted its vitality in Cal!fornia v. United 
States.41 
D. Cal!fornia v. United States 
In 1933, California authorized the Central Valley Project to re-
claim Central California.42 The Project "envisioned the coordinated 
development of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and their 
tributaries through a system of physical works to regulate and dis-
tribute water needed for agriculture, industrial, and municipal uses 
in the Central Valley of California."43 The state found itself unable 
to finance the Project, however, and in 1935 it sought and received 
federal aid.44 As phases of the original Central Valley Project were 
completed, Congress authorized additional units. In 1944,45 and 
again in 1962,46 it authorized the New Melones Project, the specific 
unit whose activities ultimately gave the Supreme Court another 
look at section 8. 
40. 373 U.S. at 587-88. 
41. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
42. Central Valley Project Act of 1933, 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 1042. For a detailed factual 
background of the Central Valley Project, see Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 
279-84 (1958); Decision 1422, California State Water Resources Control Board (1973). 
43. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 878-79 (E.D. Cal. 1975). Referring to the 
scope of the Project, the Supreme Court noted that 
Central Valley is the largest single undertaking yet embarked upon under the federal 
reclamation program. It was born in the minds of farseeing Californians in their en-
deavor to bring to that State's parched acres a water supply sufficiently permanent to 
transform them into a veritable garden for the benefit of mankind. 
Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 280 (1958). 
44. Congress authorized the Central Valley Project in the Rivers and Harbors Act of Aug. 
30, 1934, Pub. L. No. 74-409, 49 Stat. 1028; Rivers and Harbors Act of Aug. 26, 1937, Pub. L. 
No. 75-392, § 2, 50 Stat. 850; Rivers and Harbors Act of Oct. 17, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-868, 54 
Stat. 1198. 
45. Flood Control Act of Dec. 22, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (reauthorized in 
1962). 
46. The Flood Control Act of 1962, which reauthorized the Project, provides that "the 
[New Melones] project shall become an integral part of the Central Valley Project, and be 
operated and maintained by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Federal reclamation 
laws." Flood Control Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-874, 76 Stat. 1180, 1191. The New 
Melones Project provides for a dam on the Stanislaus River, approximately 35 miles northeast 
of Modesto, California, to create a reservoir impounding 2.4 million acre-feet of water for 
irrigation, flood control, municipal use, domestic use, industrial use, power, recreation, and 
water quality control. The waters involved originate and flow totally within the state of Cali-
fornia. 
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In issuing appropriation permits for the New Melones Project, 
the California Water Resource Control Board imposed twenty-five 
conditions on water use.47 These conditions, attached in the ordi-
nary course of permit evaluation,48 reflected the Board's desire that 
the proposed use be beneficial and further the public interest.49 The 
Board was not convinced that the Bureau of Reclamation needed 
water;50 it feared that the proposed use would interfere with recrea-
tional and commercial interests51 and it questioned the value of 
47. Ironically, the dispute might have been avoided had California chosen to protect in-
stream uses by a method other than attaching conditions to an appropriation permit. If Cali-
fornia had used a statute allowing a state agency to set aside water for in-stream use, as Colo-
rado does, the level of water necessary to safeguard in-stream uses would have already been 
appropriated by the state. See note 16 supra. There simply would not have been as much 
unappropriated water available for the Bureau. Consequently, the question of the validity of 
state-imposed conditions would not have arisen. 
48. Under California law, an appropriator must apply for and receive a permit before any 
water is withdrawn. See CAL. WATER CODE§§ 1201, 1250-1258 (West 1971). The Board will 
issue permits if it determines that there is sufficient unappropriated water and that the pro-
posed use will be reasonable, beneficial, and in the public interest. See CAL. WATER CODE 
§§ 1240, 1255 (West 1971). 
The Bureau has regularly applied to the Board for appropriation permits and has acquired 
at least 41 since 1945, each containing various conditions. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, 
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). Until recently, it has consistently complied 
with these conditions. 
In 1972, the Bureau applied for four appropriation permits for the New Melones Project. 
Numerous individuals, corporations, public agencies, and private associations entered protests 
to those applications. They objected primarily to the manner in which the Project would be 
operated, especially regarding the protection of downstream rights, the preservation of water 
quality, the location of areas to be served by the Project, and the purposes for which water 
would be used. 
49. Under California law the Board has broad discretion in determining whether issuance 
of a permit to appropriate water will serve the public interest. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1255 
(West 1971); Bank of America Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 
42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974). 
50. The lack of evidence the New Melones Project will be needed for consumptive use 
outside the four basin counties . . . at any definite time in the future, raises substantial 
doubt whether permits should be issued to impound more water in New Melones Reser-
voir, at least at this time, than is needed for satisfaction of prior rights and nonconsump-
tive purposes - protection and enhancement of fish and wildlife, water quality, 
recreation and generation of power. 
Decision 1422, at 17 (1973). The Board noted that the "Bureau has presented no specific plan 
for applying project water to beneficial use for consumptive purposes at any particular loca-
tion. Furthermore, the record shows that the CVP has substantial quantities of water that are 
not being used and are not under contract." Decision 1422, at 14 (1973). 
51. In view of the preponderance of the adverse consequences of maintaining a reservoir 
of the size proposed by the Bureau, the public interest requires that any permit issued 
pursuant to applications 14858 and 19304 prohibit the impoundment of water in New 
Melones Reservoir for consumptive purposes until further order of the Board following a 
showing that the benefits that will accrue from a specific _proposed use will outweigh any 
damage that would result to fish, wildlife and recreation m tlie watershed above the New 
Melones Dam and that the permitee has firm commitments to deliver water for such pur-
pose. 
Decision 1422, at 18 (1973). The Board was also concerned about the effect of the Project on 
the Stanislaus River salmon fishing industry. In addition to further study on the matter, the 
Board ordered that up to 98,000 acre-feet annually be released at a rate and timing specified by 
the Department of Fish and Game. The Board felt that it should retain jurisdiction to revise 
this requirement after further studies were completed. Decision 1422, at 20-21 (1973). 
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damming the river for hydroelectric purposes.52 
Because of these concerns, the Board imposed rather demanding 
conditions on the New Melones permits. It deferred full impound-
ment of waters until the Bureau demonstrated a plan for their use.53 
It also required the Bureau to study further the ecological effects of 
the Project,54 imposed deadlines for construction and for application 
of the waters to beneficial uses,55 demanded access to the Project,56 
mandated specific construction procedures, 57 and reserved jurisdic-
tion to impose further conditions to ensure beneficial use of Project 
water.58 
The Bureau vigorously objected to the conditions in the permits 
and sought a declaratory judgment in the Eastern District of Califor-
nia that it could appropriate water without applying to the Board.59 
Alternatively, the Bureau contended that when it did apply to the 
Board as a matter of comity, the Board could not attach conditions 
to the permit. 60 After a lengthy review of the legislative history of 
section 8 and the Supreme Court cases construing it, the district 
court identified two limited effects of the section. First, the court 
said, section 8 "requires the federal government to look at state law 
to define the property interests for which compensation must be 
made pursuant to ... eminent domain proceedings [under section 7 
of the Reclamation Act]."61 Second, it viewed section 8 as reaffirm-
ing the doctrine that "states are free to [choose] their own rules of 
water law"62 and that the federal government cannot impose either a 
riparian or an appropriation system. The court concluded that com-
ity requireq the Bureau, when acquiring water for projects, to com-
ply with the "forms" of state law, but not the "substance."63 
52. Decision 1422, at 21-24 (1973). The Board felt that the value of maintaining the river's 
existing water flow outweighed the value of water storage for hydroelectric production. As a 
result, the permit issued greatly reduced the Bureau's planned water storage behind the New 
Melones Dam. Decision 1422, at 24 (1973). 
53. Conditions l and 2, Decision l<J22, at 29-30 (1973). 
54. Conditions 3, 7, 8, 12, and 21, Decision 1422, at 30-35 (1973). 
55. Conditions 10 and 11, Decision 1422, at 32 (1973). 
56. Conditions 15 and 16, Decision 1322, at 33 (1973). 
57. For example, condition 18 required the Bureau to clear the reservoir site of vegetation, 
and condition 17 required an outlet pipe of adequate size in the stream bed to allow release of 
water entering the reservoir above the amount authorized for impoundment. Decision 1422, at 
34 (1973). 
58. Conditions 6, 9, 13, 20, and 22, Decision 1422, at 31-35 (1973). 
59. United States v. California, 403 F. Supp. 874, 877 (E.D. Cal. 1975). 
60. 403 F. Supp. at 877. 
61. 403 F. Supp. at 887. This interpretation of§ 8 is what is commonly referred to as the 
"proprietary theory," as opposed to the "veto theory." See note 24 supra. Section 7 of the 
Reclamation Act, containing the eminent domain provisions, is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 421 
(1976). 
62. 403 F. Supp. at 887-88. 
63. 403 F. Supp. at 889-90. 
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Accordingly, the court granted the declaratory judgment for the 
United States, limited only by a requirement that the Bureau apply 
to the Board as a matter of comity.64 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this 
judgment, 65 but indicated that the Bureau must apply to the Board 
for a permit as a matter of law rather than of comity.66 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, explaining that the 
legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 - particularly 
that of section 8 - made it "clear that state law was expected to 
control in two important respects."67 First, the "Secretary [ of the 
Interior must] appropriate, purchase, or condemn necessary water 
rights in strict conformity with state law."68 Second, the "distribu-
tion [of waters] to individual landowners would [also] ... be con-
trolled by state law."69 The Court expressly disapproved the 
distinction created by the lower courts between the form and the 
substance of state law, holding that the legislative history of the Rec-
lamation Act of 1902 made it "abundantly clear that Congress in-
tended to defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state water 
law."70 Thus, section 8 allows states to "impose any condition on the 
'control, appropriation, use or distribution of water' by a federal rec-
lamation project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional di-
rectives respecting the project."71 
To reach this conclusion, the Court had to distinguish Ivanhoe, 
Fresno, and Arizona. It began by restricting Ivanhoe and Fresno to 
their facts: 
[W]e disavow the dictum to the extent that it would prevent [states] 
from imposing conditions on ... permit[s] granted to the United 
States which are not inconsistent with congressional provisions author-
izing the project in question. Section 8 cannot be read to require the 
Secretary to comply with state law only when it becomes necessary to 
purchase or condemn vested water rights. . . . [I]t also requires the 
Secretary to comply with state law in the "control, appropriation, use 
or distribution of water."72 
The majority then distinguished Arizona. It explained that the Ari-
zona Court had decided that "because of the unique size and multi-
state scope of the [Boulder Canyon] Project, Congress did not intend 
64. 403 F. Supp. at 902-03. 
65. United States v. California, 558 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977). 
66. 558 F.2d at 1351. 
67. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665 (1978). 
68. 438 U.S. at 665. 
69. 438 U.S. at 667. 
70. 438 U.S. at 675. 
71. 438 U.S. at 675. Since the district court held that no conditions could be attached to an 
appropriation permit, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court for a deter-
mination of whether the conditions in Decision 1422 were inconsistent with clear congressional 
mandates. 438 U.S. at 679. 
72. 438 U.S. at 674-75. 
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the States to interfere with the Secretary's power to determine with 
whom and on what terms water contracts would be made."73 There-
fore, the California Court reasoned, the Arizona Court had not 
needed to reaffirm the dicta of Ivanhoe and Fresno "except as it re-
lated to the singular legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Pro-
ject Act."74 Beyond that particular Act, Ivanhoe and Fresno stood 
only for the proposition that "state water law does not control in the 
distribution of reclamation water if [it is] inconsistent with ... con-
gressional directives."75 
II. INTERPRETING CALIFORNIA 
In California, the Court construed section 8 to require the Bureau 
to comply with state law unless it is inconsistent with a clear congres-
sional directive.76 Beyond its own facts, California's language offers 
73. 438 U.S. at 674. 
74. 438 U.S. at 674. 
75. 438 U.S. at 668 n.21. 
76. An interesting side issue concerns the meaning of the phrase "congressional directive," 
This Note assumes that it encompasses the provisions of the reclamation acts and the statutes 
authorizing specific reclamation projects, but there are problems even with this generalization. 
"Reclamation law" is customarily defined as "the Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. 388), and all 
Acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto." 43 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1976). But while 
some laws relating to reclamation state that they are to be deemed a supplement to the recla-
mation law, a number of important laws that affect reclamation neither describe themselves as 
such, nor expressly amend existing reclamation law. See Sax, supra note 17, at 123-25. Profes-
sor Sax also notes that 
reclamation laws are further complicated by the unfortunate circumstances that, because 
of congressional reluctance to repeal obsolete laws and because of the lack of modern 
codification, the United States Code continues to carry a number of provisions that are 
obviously made obsolete by subsequent enactments, and thus in practical effect repealed. 
Id. at 124. 
Another problem arises when state law conflicts not with a "reclamation law," but with a 
federal statute outside of the "reclamation law" that in some manner affects the project. Since 
§ 8 specifies that "nothing in this Act" shall affect state law, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 390 (codified at 
43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976)), it is limited to saving state law from preemption by reclamation laws. 
Presumably, in such situations, an analysis of the legislative history of the federal statute in 
question would have to be undertaken to see if Congress intended either to occupy the field or 
in some other manner preempt state law. Section 8 would be irrelevant, and standard preemp-
tion doctrines would prevail. See generally Note, The Preemption J)octrine: Sh!fting Perspec-
tives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 15 CoLUM. L. Rev. 623 (1975). 
A final difficulty involves the administrative rulings and decisions made pursuant to one of 
· the several sections of the reclamation laws that grant the Secretary discretion to enact regula-
tions and establish procedures to implement the legislation. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 373, 440, 
485 (1976). Discussing the effect of regulations made by the Secretary, one court explained, "If 
the rule amounts to nothing more than a regulation, the purport and tendency of which is to 
carry into full force and effect the provisions of the act to which it refers, it is valid and has the 
same binding force as the law itself." Clyde v. Cummings, 35 Utah 461,465, 101 P. 106, 108 
(1909). If, on the other hand, the Secretary goes beyond merely implementing the statutes, his 
regulations and rulings are invalid. 
In analyzing this situation, one must remember that the Secretary is directed not only by 
the statute he is implementing, but also by the federalism concerns of§ 8. If a conflict arises 
between state law and the Bureau's regulation or ruling, preemption analysis should center on 
the underlying statutes which the Secretary is claiming to implement by his regulation. If tlie 
statute, under Cal!famia, is a "clear congressional directive" that overrides § 8, and the Secre-
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little guidance for resolving future federal-state water disputes. To 
understand the case's implications, one must place it alongside Ivan-
hoe, Fresno, and Arizona in the framework of preemption doctrine, 
the analysis traditionally used by courts to resolve federal-state dis-
putes. Preemption doctrine dictates that when Congress can legislate 
constitutionally in a given area, determining whether a state law in 
that area is preempted is no more than an analysis of congressional 
intent. If the state law directly conflicts with a federal statute, the 
state law must yield to the clear congressional desire. If, on the other 
hand, there is no direct conflict with a federal statute, the validity of 
the state law hinges on whether Congress intended 1) to "occupy the 
field" and thereby preclude all state legislation in the area, whether 
conflicting or not, or 2) to have nonconfiicting state laws complement 
federal laws in the area.77 The remainder of this Section interprets 
Ca!tfornia and its predecessors in light of these standard principles 
of preemption, scrutinizing the decision's implications for future rec-
lamation controversies. 
A. Occupying the Field 
The more interesting question in most preemption fights is 
whether Congress has occupied the field. In the area of reclamation 
law, however, the language of section 8 seems to indicate clearly that 
Congress did not intend to occupy the field. Nevertheless, in Ca!tfor-
nia the Bureau of Reclamation offered an "occupying the field" ar-
gument. The Bureau contended that even if Congress in 1902 had 
intended the Secretary to comply with state law, the array oflegisla-
tive enactments since that time had resulted in "such a comprehen-
sive set of reclamation laws and policies that [Congress] has left no 
room for imposition of mandatory state controls or conditions."78 
The Court blandly turned aside that argument, noting that even in 
tary is validly implementing it, the regulation would preempt state law. If either of these 
prerequisites is lacking, state law should control. 
77. When Congress has unequivocally and expressly declared that its action is meant to be 
exclusive, the state cannot regulate. For example, in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 
U.S. 605, 613 (1926), the Court found that Congress, by passing the Boiler Inspection Act and 
vesting the Interstate Co=erce Co=ission with the responsibility to enforce it, precluded a 
state requirement of safety equipment not required by the Co=ission. The Court held that 
"[t]he broad scope of the authority conferred upon the Commission" indicates that Congress 
"intended to occupy the field." See also Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961); Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947). The courts have usually required a 
strong showing of congressional intent before declaring that the federal law was intended to 
exclude state regulation, because any such conclusion "must rest on congressional intent to 
regulate exclusively - to occupy totally - the field in question." Wallach, Whose Interest: A 
Study of Administrative Preemption, 25 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 258, 263 (1975). See California 
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949) ("Congressional purpose to displace local laws must be 
clearly manifested."). 
78. Brief for Appellee at 59, California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
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1902 the Reclamation Act was "not devoid of such directives."79 To 
the Court, the presence of mandatory directives together with section 
8 in the 1902 Act was sufficient evidence that Congress did not in-
tend by subsequent directives alone to occupy the entire reclamation 
.field.80 In general, more explicit action would be needed to override 
section S's language. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seems to have concluded that 
Congress intended to occupy one comer of the reclamation .field, sec-
tion 8 notwithstanding. The Court in Arizona v. Cal!fornia,81 im-
pressed by the vast size and multistate character of the Boulder 
Canyon Project, decided that Congress had intended to preempt 
completely any state law affecting the Project. In Cal!fornia, the 
Court distinguished Arizona, reaffirming the unique scope of the 
Boulder Project. At least in theory, the Court also left open the pos-
sibility that other Bureau projects could be classified as "comprehen-
sive." 
The general tenor of the Cal!fornia opinion, however, suggests 
little desire to expand the Arizona exception in the future. More-
over, the Boulder Canyon Project is easily distinguished from most 
Bureau projects. First, the Boulder Canyon Project touches many 
states: project water from an interstate stream is distributed to users 
in Nevada, California, and Arizona. Most of the Bureau's projects, 
such as the Central Valley Project, distribute water in only one state. 
And among those projects using water from interstate streams, the 
Boulder Canyon Project was unusual in that, at the time the project 
was established, the concerned states had not agreed on a means of 
assessing their relative rights to water. 82 Therefore, the Act had to 
apportion water among the states,83 relying on the Secretary's con-
tracts with water users within the several states. 84 Second, the stat-
utes authorizing the Boulder Canyon Project are far more 
comprehensive than the authorizing legislation for the rest of the Bu-
reau's projects.85 Finally, section 5 of the Boulder Canyon Project 
79. 438 U.S. at 678 n.31. 
80. 438 U.S. at 668 n.21. 
81. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
82. See generally Corker, Water Rights in Interstate Streams in 2 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS 293-372. (R. Clark ed. 1967). Three methods exist for states to establish an apportion-
ment of interstate streams: an interstate compact with approval of Congress; an equitable 
apportionment action within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and an act of 
Congress. The last technique was recognized by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 
373 U.S. 546, 564-65 (1963), where it approved the apportionment of waters of the lower Colo-
rado River by the Boulder Canyon Project Act. 
83. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-65 (1963). 
84. To obtain water from the Project, users had to contract with the Secretary, who was 
guided in his contracts by the congressional apportionment. 
85. The Boulder Canyon Project Act is codified separately from the authorizations of other 
projects of a size requiring congressional approval. Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057, 
43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617u, 618-618p (1976). Moreover, the Act as codified occupies nearly a 
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Act is unique in that it authorizes the Secretary to enter into con-
tracts with individual waters users, 86 giving him greater discretion 
than he possesses under the 1902 Act or any other legislation author-
izing a reclamation project. 
Cal!fornia and Arizona thus suggest that Congress has occupied 
the field of reclamation law only where a project distributes water to 
users in several states, and state laws or compacts do not provide 
adequate coordination for distributing that water.87 Furth_ermore, 
Ca/!fornia hints that the Court will find the necessary intent to oc-
cupy the field only where Congress drafts unusually complex and 
explicit authorizing legislation. California may thus be said to hold 
that outside the narrow scope of the Arizona exception, state laws 
regulating federal reclamation projects are presumptively valid un-
less they directly conflict with a specific federal statute. 
B. Preemption by Co,iffict 
Preemption by conflict requires a direct and obvious clash be-
tween the state and federal law.88 Such a clash is clearest when com-
pliance with the terms of both the federal and state directives is 
impossible. 89 In such cases, the supremacy clause renders the 
strength of the state interest irrelevant. Courts, however, usually de-
mand a convincing showing of conflict before they will invalidate a 
state law: "[T]he repugnance or conflict should be direct and posi-
tive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand 
together. "90 
Ivanhoe offers an excellent example of a "direct" conflict. Cali-
fornia law prohibited restrictions on the acreage a project user could 
dozen pages. By comparison, most project authorizations occupy only a few special provi-
sions. See, e.g., Baker Project, 43 U.S.C. §§ 616t-616w (1976); Norman Project, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 615aa-615hh (1976). 
86. Act of Dec. 21, 1928, ch. 42, § 5, 45 Stat. 1060 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976)). 
87. A court might conclude that the Colorado River Storage Project, which provides for 
development of the Upper Colorado River Basin, is "comprehensive" enough to warrant a 
finding that Congress intended to occupy the field. The project involves massive development 
of the water resources in a multistate area faced with some of the same problems as the Boul-
der Canyon Project. Act of Apr. 11, 1956, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105, as amended, 76 Stat. 102 
(1962), 78 Stat. 852 (1964), 82 Stat. 896 (1968) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-6200 (1976)). 
Other projects distributing water to more than one state include the Spokane Valley Project 
(Washington and Idaho), Act of Sept. 16, 1959, Pub. L. No. 87-276, 73 Stat. 561, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 615s-615u (1976); and the San Juan-Chama Project (Colorado and New Mexico), Act of 
June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96, 43 U.S.C. § 615ii (1976). 
88. See, e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. 
227, 243 (1859). 
89. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377-80 (1946); Clover Leaf Butter Co. v. 
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 399-401 
(1907). 
90. Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. 227, 243 (1859). See also California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 
725, 733 (1949); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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irrigate, while Congress explicitly required a restriction.91 Similarly, 
Fresno presented a situation where the California priority system of 
water uses flatly contradicted the priority system set forth in the fed-
eral reclamation act.92 In these cases, the conflicting statutes clearly 
required a .finding of preemption. Since the general respect for state 
laws expressed in section 8 was not intended to override specific con-
gressional intent expressed elsewhere in the reclamation laws, clearly 
incompatible state water law cannot survive. 
In the more difficult cases, such as Ca!!fornia, one could comply 
with both federal and state law, although the state provision may 
impede attainment of the federal goal. The State Board in Califor-
nia did not absolutely bar completion of the New Melones Dam. It 
approved the Bureau's application for a permit but required several 
measures to protect wildlife and ensure "beneficial use" of the ap-
propriated waters.93 The Bureau never argued that it could not meet 
the conditions; it argued simply that it did not have to meet them.94 
As a result, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the condi-
tions imposed by the Board were incompatible with the project. The 
Court held only that if the conditions were not incompatible, the 
Bureau had to comply with them. It then remanded the case for 
"additional factfinding."9s 
Under standard preemption theory, where the state law and fed-
eral law are not explicitly contradictory, but are potentially inconsis-
tent, the test is "whether, under the circumstances of the particular 
case, ... [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress."96 The 
Supreme Court has cautioned against preempt~g state laws due to 
91. 357 U.S. 275 (1958). In Ivanhoe, the California Supreme Court held that the excess 
land provision, 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976), violated California law. See text at note 26 S11pra. 
92. See text at notes 31-34 S11pra. 
93. 438 U.S. 645, 652 & n.8 (1978). 
94. See text at notes 59-60 S11pra. 
95. 438 U.S. at 679. 
96. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Supreme Court applied this principle 
most clearly in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Perez v. Camp-
bell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). In Sears, a state attempted to protect a lamp design that did not 
qualify for a federal patent. Invalidating the state protection, the Court explained, "Just as a 
State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, 
... give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws." 376 
U.S. at 231. Perez involved a conflict between § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 
(1976), and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 28-1101 
to -1225 (1956). The Bankruptcy Act allows the discharge of tort claims, but the Arizona Act 
provided that an uninsured motorist against whom a judgment had been rendered concerning 
an automobile accident would have his license and vehicle registration suspended until the 
judgment was satisfied. The Act specified that a discharge in bankruptcy would not "relieve 
the judgment debtor from any requirements of the article." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN, § 28-
1163(B) (1956). The Court invalidated the Arizona law on the grounds that it frustrated the 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, which was to give the debtor a new opportunity in life and a 
clear field for the future, unhampered by any preexisting debt. 
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minor potential conflicts with federal law, for to do so would "ignore 
... this Court's decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts be-
tween state and federal regulation where none clearly exists."97 
The Court has been particularly reluctant to preempt state law 
where the potentially conflicting federal legislation contemplates co-
operation between state and federal officials. In New York State .De-
partment of Social Services v . .Dublino,98 the Court stated, "Where 
coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary ad-
ministrative framework, and in pursuit of common purposes, the 
case for federal preemption becomes a less persuasive one."99 In 
.Dublino, the New York Department of Social Services required cer-
tain employable individuals to receive education and job training if 
they were to continue to receive AFDC100 payments. Dublino 
claimed that the state program conflicted with a similar federal pro-
gram.101 Because both the state and federal governments contrib-
uted to the AFDC program, the Court hesitated to strike down the 
state program unless the conflict was significant. It noted that pre-
emption is a "sweeping step that strikes at the core of state preroga-
tive under the . . . program - a program which this court has been 
careful to describe as a 'scheme of cooperative federalism.' " 102 
Thus, where a party seeks to preempt a state law related to a pro-
gram involving "cooperative federalism," a stronger showing of con-
flict is necessary to invalidate the state statute. Significantly, the 
Court in California described the Reclamation Act of 1902 as an 
early example of cooperative federalism. 103 
97. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960). In Huron, 
Detroit's smoke abatement ordinance prohibited conduct that federal ship licensing require-
ments allowed. See also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, (1976), where the Court reaffirmed its 
preference for reconciling the operation of both state and federal statutory schemes with one 
another rather than holding one completely ousted. 
Unfortunately, the line between those cases where the Court upheld the challenged state 
law and those where it has held the state law preempted is anything but bright. In Franklin 
Natl. Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954), for example, the Court struck down a state 
statute prohibiting national banks from using the words "savings" or "saving" in their adver-
tisements and business. The Court found that the statute conflicted with § 24 of the Federal 
Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1952). The Reserve Act authorized national banks to "continue 
hereafter to receive time and savings deposits." The Court held that the state prohibition on 
advertising impaired the power implicitly granted national banks by the Federal Reserve Act. 
98. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
99. 413 U.S. at 421. 
100. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program is codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976). It provides financial assistance for families with dependent children 
living at home. The New York work rules are codified in N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 350-b to -i 
(McKinney 1976). 
101. Federal Work Incentive Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-644 (1976). 
102. 413 U.S. at 413. 
103. "If the term 'cooperative federalism' had been in vogue in 1902, the Reclamation Act 
of that year would surely have qualified as a leading example of it .... Reflective of the 
'cooperative federalism' which the Act embodied is § 8." California v. United States, 438 U.S. 
645, 650 (1978). 
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Against this doctrinal background, the Court will probably not 
find many state water law provisions preempted by conflicts with 
federal reclamation statutes. Most reclamation projects serve several 
purposes,104 which often conflict with each other. For example, the 
New Melones Dam had, according to the Court, "the multiple pur-
poses of flood control, irrigation, municipal use, industrial use, 
power, recreation, water quality control, and the protection of fish 
and wildlife."105 Yet it is impossible to maximize all of these pur-
poses simultaneously. To control floods best, a reservoir should be 
emptied immediately after a flood, to be ready for the next one; yet 
irrigation is best served by filling the reservoir in the spring and 
gradually drawing the level down during the dry summer months; 
and for best recreational use, the reservoir should be nearly full at all 
times. 106 
State water law will rarely be wholly inconsistent with such mul-
tiple purposes. Typically, a state water law will impair one purpose 
but promote another. 107 Thus, instead of clearly frustrating federal 
purposes, state law will usually establish priorities among the pro-
ject's conflicting purposes. Section 8 thus gives the states significant 
latitude to protect and promote the beneficial use of their waters. Of 
course, Congress may limit or eliminate that latitude by enunciating 
its own priority of purposes in legislation authorizing a reclamation 
project. Where Congress has done so, contrary state purposes and 
priorities must fall. However, under the resuscitated section 8, Con-
gress must express its wish to preempt state law in explicit terms. 
Since most reclamation projects espouse multiple purposes, some of 
which are compatible with state water law, 108 state rules will control 
most of the projects to which they apply. 
104. For instance, Congress authorized the Arbuckle Project in Oklahoma for the "princi-
pal" purposes of "storing," regulating, and furnishing water for municipal, domestic, and in-
dustrial use, and for controlling floods and for the conservation and development of fish and 
wildlife, and the enhancement of recreational opportunities." Act of Aug. 24, 1962, Pub. L. 
No. 87-594, 76 Stat. 395 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 616K (1976)). See also San Angelo Project, 
Texas, Act of Aug. 16, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-152, 71 Stat. 372 (codified at 43 U.S.C, § 6150 
(1976)). 
105. 438 U.S. at 651. 
106. See A. G0LZE, RECLAMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 167 (1961). 
107. For example, the State Board in California was particularly concerned that the Project 
not interfere with in-stream uses for wildlife and recreation. 438 U.S. at 652 n.8. 
108. Few of the Bureau's major projects have only a single purpose, and these few gener-
ally involve wells and pumping stations, not reservoirs. For instance, the Spokane Valley Pro-
ject, Washington and Idaho, Pub. L. No. 87-630, § la, 76 Stat. 431 (1962) (codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 615s (1976)), provides water for irrigation and municipal use, two relatively compati-
ble purposes. (The uses are compatible as both require a gradual use of stored supply during 
the dry period, with replenishment during the wet period.) If a state impairs the purpose of a 
single-purpose project (or a project with compatible purposes), it is not merely shifting the 
priorities among multiple purposes, but is obstructing a clear directive of Congress. In such a 
case, preemption is indisputable. 
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Ill. .APPLYING CALIFORNIA 
In California, the Supreme Court departed from its restricted 
construction of section 8 in Ivanhoe, Fresno, and Arizona. But Cali-
fornia left unanswered a few specific questions about the scope of 
section 8's applicability. This Section offers tentative responses to 
two of these questions . 
.Does California allow state law to alter existing projects? 
California involved state restrictions on a project that the Bureau 
had not yet built. However, since the Court's opinion mandated that 
the Secretary conform with state law relating to the "control, appro-
priation, use or distribution of water,"109 state water law could also 
affect existing Bureau projects. Such an application of a new state 
law is not improbable.110 A similar problem would arise if state offi-
cials had not attempted to apply existing law to a project because of 
mistaken assumptions about the proper construction of section 8. 
California suggests that standard preemption doctrine should still 
govern a retroactive application of the state law. 111 However, the 
application would have to survive a two-pronged test: The law 
would have to satisfy the California preemption standard, and it 
would then have to undergo scrutiny for unconstitutional retroactiv-
ity.112 
While the constitutional implications of retroactive legislation 
are beyond the scope of this Note, it should be observed that there 
are several obstacles113 to applying subsequently adopted state laws 
to an existing project if the application would threaten the project's 
109. 438 U.S. at 674. Although it is conceivable that a future Court might deem this lan-
guage improvident dicta and limit Cal!fomia to the issue of state appropriation regulations, 
such a prospect is unlikely. 
110. For example, a state safety law relating to dams could require changes in Bureau 
operating procedures, a new state water quality law might require water releases to meet qual-
ity standards, or a state might alter its statutory definition of beneficial use to exclude a use 
currently made by an individual receiving project water. 
111. "A retroactive statute is one which gives to preenactment conduct a different legal 
effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute." Hochman, 17ze 
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 
(1960). 
112. Professor Hochman suggests that courts should weigh three factors to determine the 
validity of retroactive legislation: (1) the nature and strength of the public interest served by 
the legislation, (2) the extent of abrogation of the asserted preenactment right, and (3) the 
degree to which the right has been asserted and enforced prior to the enactment of the statute. 
Furthermore, he notes that the "Court has consistently held that not all [retroactive] ..• stat-
utes are unconstitutional, but only those which, upon a balancing of the considerations on both 
sides, are felt to be unreasonable." Id. at 694-95. See also Slawson, Constitutional and Legisla-
tive Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 216 (1960). 
113. State retroactive legislation is often attacked on the ground that it impairs the obliga-
tion of contracts. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Assn., 
310 U.S. 32 (1940); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). It can also be 
stricken for depriving persons of property without just compensation or due process. U.S. 
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economic feasibility. When projects are initiated, the Bureau con-
ducts studies to ascertain whether the project is economically feasi-
ble. In this analysis, the Bureau allocates project costs between 
"reimbursable uses," such as irrigation, industrial uses, and the mu-
nicipal water supply, all of which return money to the Bureau, and 
"nonreimbursable uses," such as fish and wildlife management, rec-
reation, and flood control. The Bureau only undertakes projects ap-
proaching economic self-sufficiency.114 Thus, new state regulations 
could alter facts about state law that the Bureau had justifiably relied 
on when it initiated the project. If, for example, a state law required 
the release of impounded water to enhance stream values, it would 
reduce the amount available for reimbursable uses. As a result, the 
federal government would lose funds and be forced to subsidize im-
provement of the local environment. Of course, the state might com-
pensate the Bur~au for the diversion, but compensation might not 
save government contracts with water users, some of which could not 
be performed because of the reduced amount of water available to 
the Bureau. Moreover, by obtaining valid permits and completing 
construction of a project, the Bureau may acquire vested property 
rights, just like an individual appropriator. The state would have to 
compensate the Bureau for taking these property rights in the same 
manner as it would compensate individual property owners. Thus, 
any state law that would alter the operation of an existing project 
should be subject to close examination.115 
Does California allow state law to prevent construction 
of a project completely? 
While the lower courts in California ruled that the state must is-
sue the Bureau a permit if unappropriated water exists, 116 the 
Supreme Court did not specifically address this issue. Several states 
have provisions authorizing the state board to refuse any appropria-
tion permit if the board determines that it would not be in the public 
interest. 117 Thus, unless prevented by clear congressional directives, 
CoNST. amend. XIV. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Louis-
ville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Rudford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935). 
114. In reality, Bureau projects have never paid for themselves. Nevertheless, the Bureau 
does not initiate projects unless it decides that the return of money from reimbursable uses, 
coupled with public benefits from the nonreimbursable aspects of a project, justify the expen• 
diture required. See A. Goue, supra note 106, at 218-28. 
115. Presumably, the challenge to most retroactive state laws reducing the capacity of a 
project would be based either on the contract clause or the due process clause. As Professor 
Hochman indicates, the Court's decision will be heavily influenced by the public interests 
served on both sides. Hochman, supra note 111, at 694. A typical case might balance the 
Bureau's interest in having a dependable water supply against a growing public interest in an 
in-stream use. 
116. See text at notes 64-65 supra. 
117. See note 14 supra. 
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these states could theoretically thwart the initiation of a project 
within their boundaries. 
Under the Reclamation Act of 1902, the Secretary was "author-
ized in his discretion to locate and construct reclamation projects."118 
The Cal!fornia Court believed that the history of section 8 demon-
strated that if "state law did not allow for the appropriation . . . of 
the necessary water, Congress did not intend the Secretary . . . to 
initiate the project."119 However subsequent legislation authorizing 
a project may evince a specific congressional intent that the Secre-
tary be allowed to appropriate or condemn the required water, and 
thus override the general intent to honor state law embodied in sec-
tion 8.120 
As a practical matter, this problem is unlikely to arise. Because 
reclamation programs almost invariably entail federal-state coopera-
tion, the Bureau will probably not initiate a project unless the states 
involved have indicated their support. Nevertheless, the Court in 
Cal!fornia left open the possibility that states might deny the Bureau 
permits because of their own public interest assessments. Cal!fornia 
should require the Bureau to respect such assessments, absent a clear 
contrary signal from Congress. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As a result of Cal!fornia, the states have regained control over 
their waters, control that earlier decisions construing section 8 had 
apparently removed. This victory may hold more academic than 
practical significance, as disputes between the states and the Bureau 
should seldom reach the courts. All the Western states participate in 
the planning of new reclamation projects within their borders. Fur-
thermore, since the enactment of the Flood Control Act of 1944, 121 
they also review reports of projects proposed by the Bureau.122 State 
participation in the planning stages should resolve most state objec-
tions before the. Bureau undertakes a project. 123 
118. See 438 U.S. at 669 n.21. 
119. See 438 U.S. at 669 n.21. 
120. No such legislation was before the Court in Cal!fomia, and hence this issue was left 
unanswered. 438 U.S, at 669 n.21. 
121. 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-l(c) (1976)): "In the event a submis-
sion of views and recommendations, made by an affected State ... sets forth objections to the 
plans or proposals covered by the report of the Secretary of the Interior, the proposed works 
shall not be deemed authorized except upon approval by an Act of Congress." 
See also 43 U.S.C. § 422(d) (1976): "Any proposal with respect to the construction of a 
project which has not theretofore been authorized for construction under the Federal reclama-
tion laws ... shall have been submitted for review by the States of the drainage basin in 
which the project is located in like manner as provided in section 701-l(c) of Title 33." 
122. A. GoLZE, supra note 106, at lll-12. 
123. Most state-federal conflicts in reclamation will probably arise either when state law is 
changed after the initiation of a project, or when there is a significant time lapse between the 
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However, for those federal-state conflicts over reclamation 
projects that persist, 124 Ca!!fornia offers courts new guidelines for in-
terpreting the ubiquitous section 8. It acknowledges congressional 
occupancy of a narrow field of reclamation law - the law governing 
the Boulder Canyon Project. It also calls for preemption where it is 
physically impossible to comply with both state and federal man-
dates, and where state law is clearly inconsistent with an express con-
gressional purpose. On the other hand, where state law enhances 
certain federal objectives and incidentally impedes - but does not 
bar - attainment of others, Ca!!fornia requires the state provision to 
control. 
Because its holding was limited, 125 the Court in Ca/!fornia left 
many gaps for the lower courts to fill. Most notably, the decision 
planning stage and the time for requesting an appropriation permit, during which conditions 
have changed to make the project less attractive to the state. Disputes may also arise as a 
result of the necessarily vague plans the Bureau has at the project-initiation stage regarding 
exactly who will receive water and on what terms. This was one of the difficulties in Ca/!for-
nia. The California State Water Resources Board was concerned that, at the time of applica-
tion, the Bureau did not have firm commitments for the use of project water. See note 52 
SIIJJra. However, as a practical matter, the Bureau usually does not enter into contracts with 
ultimate users until it is assured that it will receive water for its projects. 
Where the Bureau's plans are vague, a state may not realize that the intended use is con-
trary to state law until after the appropriation permit is granted, and the Bureau enters into 
contracts with water users. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. 
Dist., 125 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1976), qjfd., 20 Cal. 3d 327, 572 P.2d 1128, 142 Cal. Rptr. 904, 
vacated, 439 U.S. 811 (1978). 
124. Certain provisions in state water laws are likely to foment such conflicts. For in-
stance, statutes establishing priority of water use are in effect in many states. See, e.g., ARIZ, 
R.E.v. STAT. ANN. § 45-147 (1979). These statutes generally provide that domestic use shall 
have priority over irrigation, and irrigation over industrial use. Some Western states also pro-
hibit the appropriation of water for use outside of the state, which could pose conflicts with 
federal projects proposing to distribute water to users in several states. See, e.g., OR. REV, 
STAT.§ 537.810 (1977); Cow. REV. STAT.§ 37-81-101 (1973). The continued validity of these 
statutes may well be in doubt. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), 
qjfd., 385 U.S. 35 (1966). 
Some states statutorily define beneficial use by excluding certain uses that are deemed not 
beneficial. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN, § 89-2911(4) (1977 Supp.) (use of water to 
export coal slurry from the state is not a beneficial use). Problems may arise when, after the 
state has appropriated water to the Bureau, the Secretary in his discretion contracts with a user 
whose use would not be beneficial. See note 123 Sllpra. 
A few states specifically limit the amount of water per acre that may be appropriated for 
irrigation. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 33 (West 1970). If a Bureau contract ex-
ceeded the statutory limit, courts and administrative agencies would face a Ca/!fornia problem. 
Finally, many states place dams and reservoirs under the jurisdiction of state administrative 
officials. Arizona, for example, provides that all dams in the state are under the jurisdiction of 
the state engineer, and virtually nothing affecting a dam can be done without his approval. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45-702(A) (1956). If the state engineer in performing his job decided 
that some aspect of the dam was unsatisfactory a conflict could arise with officials in the Bu-
reau who believed present operations or structures were satisfactory. 
None of these statutory provisions, however, necessarily conflicts with federal reclamation 
projects. By working together in the planning process, state and federal officials could avoid 
much litigation and develop projects that better meet the needs of state citizens as well as 
citizens across the nation. 
125. See text at notes 93-95 SIIJJra. 
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does not clarify satisfactorily the distinction between intrastate and 
comprehensive interstate projects such as the Boulder Canyon Pro-
ject in Arizona.126 But whatever its shortcomings, the opinion sup-
plies a sound legal framework for supervising the continuing 
cooperation between states and the Bureau in planning, constructing, 
and operating reclamation projects. 
126. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
